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OBSCURITY BY DESIGN
Woodrow Hartzog* and Frederic Stutzman**
Abstract: Design-based solutions to confront technological privacy threats are becoming
popular with regulators. However, these promising solutions have left the full potential of
design untapped. With respect to online communication technologies, design-based solutions
for privacy remain incomplete because they have yet to successfully address the trickiest
aspect of the Internet—social interaction. This Article posits that privacy-protection
strategies such as “Privacy by Design” face unique challenges with regard to social software
and social technology due to their interactional nature.
This Article proposes that design-based solutions for social technologies benefit from
increased attention to user interaction, with a focus on the principles of “obscurity” rather
than the expansive and vague concept of “privacy.” The main thesis of this Article is that
obscurity is the optimal protection for most online social interactions and, as such, is a
natural locus for design-based privacy solutions for social technologies. To that end, this
Article develops a model of “obscurity by design” as a means to address the privacy
problems inherent in social technologies and the Internet.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy by design, that is, “the philosophy and approach of
embedding privacy into the design specifications of various
technologies,” promises to alter the law’s largely reactive approach to
privacy threats.1 Government and industry are gradually embracing
privacy by design and other design-based strategies to protect Internet
users.2 To ensure wide applicability, the Privacy by Design approach
offers little domain-specific guidance. However, with the growth of the
Internet and social technologies, designing usable and effective privacy
for technologically mediated social interaction (such as the interaction
afforded by social media) is an urgent challenge, one deserving of
investigation.
1. ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1 (2009), available at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/
Resources/privacybydesign.pdf [hereinafter CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN]; see ANN
CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), available at
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter
CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES].
2. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Report of the Art. 29 Data Protection
Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice on The Future of Privacy at 3, (Dec. 1,
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf;
FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
BUSINESSES
AND
POLICYMAKERS
(2012),
available
at
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/
120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY].
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Over the past forty years, regulators and technologists have expended
significant effort managing the privacy risk inherent in the collection and
storage of personal information.3 In the era of social media and
behavioral tracking, the vast databases (i.e., “big data”) that store
personal information pose significant threats, but these databases and
their parent organizations are far from the only threat to privacy on the
Internet. The growth of the social web has demonstrated that information
sharing inherent in the management of online relationships through
social media present their own privacy challenges. As billions of
individuals participate in social media, the vast amount of information
disclosed and transferred between individuals—an inherent requirement
for social interaction online—poses a new class of privacy threat that
should be addressed through design.4
Addressing the vexing privacy problems of the social web is a
challenging task. Few can agree on a conceptualization of privacy,5
much less how to protect privacy in our social interactions by design.6
There are a number of practical reasons why privacy by design has
avoided the social side of the user interface. The translation of regulation
to implementation is a complex process and may be more efficient when
applied to formal technologies (e.g., databases, protocols).7 Additionally,
there is little guidance regarding how designers should approach the
implementation of privacy by design in a contextually variant,
interactional space. Many substantive protections entailed in privacy by
design are effectuated on the “back end” of technologies, such as data
3. ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY, Version 1.91 (2012),
available at bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.
4. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2007); danah boyd, Why Youth
(Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH,
IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 133 (David Buckingham ed., 2008); Lauren Gelman, Privacy,
Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009); James
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009); Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross &
Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, J.
PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY, 2012, at 7, available at http://repository.cmu.edu/jpc/vol4/iss2/2/.
5. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 4; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Stephen T.
Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories of Privacy, 59 J. SOC.
ISSUES 411 (2003).
6. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1409, 1421
(2011) (“Privacy by design is an amorphous concept.”); Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good,
Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, (New
York Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-43, 2012), available at
https://www.privacyassociation.org/media/pdf/events_and_programs/Privacy%20by%20DesignA%20Counterfactual%20Analysis.pdf.
7. Seda Gürses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Address at the Computers, Privacy & Data
Prot. Annual Conference: Engineering Privacy by Design (Jan. 29-30, 2011).
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security through encryption, data minimization techniques, anonymity,
and structural protection though organizational prioritization of privacy.8
However, the design of social technologies must consider “front end”
privacy concerns such as privacy settings, search visibility, password
protections, and the ability to use pseudonyms.9
The answer to these challenges might lie in refining the goal for the
design of social technologies. The current goal of design solutions is
“privacy,” which is too broad and opaque to provide meaningful
guidance in designing social technologies. Indeed, one conceptualization
of privacy, secrecy, can be seen as antithetical to the notion of social
interaction. This Article recommends looking to the related concept of
obscurity. Empirical evidence demonstrates that Internet users aim to
produce and rely upon obscurity to protect their social interaction
online.10 The concept of online “obscurity,” defined here as a context in
which information is relatively difficult to find or understand, is a much
more defined and attainable goal for social technology designers.
Obscurity is more flexible than some conceptualizations of privacy and
also more feasible to implement. Moreover, obscurity involves more
than prohibitions on conduct; internet users can actively produce
obscurity themselves.
The main thesis of this Article is that obscurity is an optimal
protection for social interaction online and, as such, is a useful concept
and design pattern when addressing front-end (i.e., user-facing) privacy
concerns. Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to introduce and
develop the concept of “obscurity by design” as a model for designbased privacy solutions in social technologies. In doing so, we provide
organizations who wish to embrace privacy-protective design principles
with a useful set of tools for approaching these interactional privacy
concerns.
Part I of this Article reviews the broader concept of privacy by
design, including its strengths, the challenges to its implementation, and
its missed opportunity in failing to account for the front-end design of
social technologies. Part II sets forth our conceptualization of obscurity,
including the four major factors of online obscurity: (1) search visibility,

8. See GELLMAN, supra note 3.
9. See Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK
769 (2012), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id= 2145320&bnc=1 [hereinafter Stutzman
& Hartzog, Boundary Regulation]; Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity].
10. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
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(2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. This Article
proposes that the four factors of online obscurity constitute a set of
principles that designers should consider when building privacy into
social technologies. Finally, Part III proposes a model to implement
obscurity by design. This model suggests that obscurity by design can be
effectuated through a combination of technologies, policies, and
behavioral interventions.
I.

PRIVACY BY DESIGN MUST BE CLARIFIED TO APPLY TO
THE USER INTERFACE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

In recent years, consumer technologies have embraced the broad
collection and storage of personal information. Behavioral advertising,
consumer forecasting, and geolocational systems have pushed—and
created new—boundaries for the collection of data about users.11 While
many industries argue that increased data will lead to better products and
predictions,12 the collection and storage of this data potentially opens
consumers and companies to novel risk.
Early approaches to protect the information and privacy rights of
consumers were to punish violators by utilizing torts, statutes, and
regulations to levy fines and injunctions.13 These “reactive” approaches
remain in use, but the challenges of web-scale technologies, and the
scale of risks such as breach or hacking, require a proactive approach to
privacy protection.14 These modern “design-based” solutions to privacy
11. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2; FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 3 (2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY
DISCLOSURES] (“[M]obile devices can reveal precise information about a user’s location that could
be used to build detailed profiles of consumer movements over time and in ways not anticipated by
consumers. Indeed, companies can use a mobile device to collect data over time and ‘reveal[] the
habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life.’”) (quoting
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Josh Halliday, Facebook Users
Unwittingly Revealing Intimate Secrets, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/mar/11/facebook-users-reveal-intimate-secrets; Press
Release, FTC, FTC to Study Data Broker Industry’s Collection and Use of Consumer Data (Dec.
18, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/databrokers.shtm.
12. See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011), available at http://www.
mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation.
13. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914271; Michael
D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127 (2008).
14. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2; Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011).
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focus on concepts such as data minimization, security, information
policy, and disclosure of information practices. This proactive approach
to privacy has crystallized in the privacy-by-design movement, which
seeks to build “the principles of Fair Information Practices (FIPs) into
the design, operation and management of information processing
technologies and systems.”15 This Part will review the history of privacy
by design and review the challenges to its implementation in various
contexts, notably the user interface of social media.
A.

Privacy by Design Challenges Organizations to Rethink
Established Approaches to Privacy

Privacy by design can best be thought of as a technological design
framework; when this framework is embraced in the design phase, the
resultant technology should embody privacy protection. In this sense,
“privacy” is not an afterthought or a security treatment, but an essential
value in the design and construction process.
The privacy by design movement can be traced back to Dr. Ann
Cavoukian, the Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario,
Canada.16 Cavoukian’s approach to privacy by design is illustrated in
numerous white papers,17 as well as an edited volume of the journal
Identity in the Information Society.18 Cavoukian’s approach to privacy
by design argues for the inclusion of Fair Information Principles into the
design of technologies. These principles include:
1. Recognition that privacy interests and concerns must be addressed
proactively;
2. Application of core principles expressing universal spheres of
privacy protection;
3. Early mitigation of privacy concerns when developing information
technologies and systems, throughout the entire information life
cycle—end to end;
4. Need for qualified privacy leadership and/or professional input;
5. Adoption and integration of privacy-enhancing technologies
15. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1.; see CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1; Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1421–22; Rubinstein &
Good, supra note 6, at 1, 5–7.
16. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1; CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1.
17. Rubinstein & Good, supra note 6, at 6.
18. See generally Privacy by Design: The Next Generation in the Evolution of Privacy, 3
IDENTITY INFO. SOC’Y 247 (2010) (special issue devoted to privacy by design), available at
http://link.springer.com/journal/12394/3/2/page/1.
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(PETs);
6. Embedding privacy in a positive-sum (not zero-sum) manner so as
to enhance both privacy and system functionality; and
7. Respect for users’ privacy.19
The privacy by design approach has proven to be a useful innovation
within the design community, where emphasis is often placed on PETs
or ex post remedies. Using a process lens, privacy by design argues that
privacy is a critical part of the socio-technical infrastructure of
technologies, and that privacy is both a value and a tangible component
that must be included in technologies. To accomplish this goal,
Cavoukian argues that privacy by design should be valued through the
organizational hierarchy (e.g., qualified leadership) and that the privacy
outcomes should be positive for the user.20 In a sense, privacy by design
provides both process and infrastructure for the inclusion of privacy as
both a value and a tangible good in the design of technical systems (as
well as organizational practices and physical design, notes Cavoukian).21
In reaction to failures of privacy enhancing technologies or ex post
measures as a robust privacy strategy, privacy organizations,
government regulators, and industry groups are moving toward privacy
by design as a potential information-age remedy to privacy threats. In
2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) privacy framework,
“Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Age of Rapid Change,” strongly
encouraged companies to adopt privacy-by-design approaches to their
business and technical operations.22 Furthermore, the European Data
Protection Supervisor also strongly recommended privacy by design as a
requirement in the forthcoming data protection regulation—potentially
requiring firms in the EU, as well as those doing business with EU firms,
to follow privacy by design under threat of fines or other legal action.23
The adoption of privacy by design by regulatory agencies as a guideline
or requirement would require organizations to change the way privacy is
treated in the process of technology design. Such a regulatory move
19. CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1; see CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1.
20. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 3.
21. See id. at 4–5.
22. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2. Privacy by design was also one of
the “three core principles” called upon by the FTC in a recent report on mobile app privacy. FTC,
MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 6.
23. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Comprehensive
Approach On Personal Data Protection in the European Union, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4,
2010).
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would be noteworthy, as there are a number of challenges to its
implementation.
B.

Obscurity Can Improve Privacy by Design

The adoption of privacy by design as a universal approach to privacy
poses a set of significant challenges for implementers. General criticisms
include a lack of incentives for the deployment of privacy by design,
questions about its enforceability, the inherent organizational challenges
of adopting and applying new privacy practices, and the technical
hurdles of a privacy by design development model.24 While these
criticisms are sharp, it is clear that privacy by design is a useful way of
addressing the privacy challenges that technology designers face. The
design of technology is an interdisciplinary problem that involves the
coordination of engineers, managers, lawyers, policymakers, and
executives within an organization. The privacy by design approach helps
address these challenges by setting forth values that disparate parts of
the organization can embody in the design process. Of course, this is
often easier said than done.
As outlined by Ira Rubinstein, two of the primary challenges facing
privacy by design include a weak specification of the privacy by design
approach and lack of incentives for the firm to adopt it.25 Here we
concentrate on Rubinstein’s question of incentives. Rubinstein considers
why firms would adopt privacy by design (as well as PETs), exploring
endogenous motivation, market demand, and regulatory potential.26 To
the question of endogenous motivation, firms are differentially
motivated towards privacy based on data collected, tolerance of risk, and
economic impact of privacy breaches. Therefore, motivation as an
endogenous trait is not uniformly distributed across firms.27 Rubinstein
then questions consumer valuation of privacy and PETs, arguing that
there is little market demand for privacy goods (even non-zero-sum
goods).28 Finally, Rubinstein explores the potential for regulatory
enforcement, finding that regulatory capability to enforce privacy by
design to be premature due to challenges in establishing consent orders
based on privacy by design language.29
24. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 6.
25. See id. at 1414–44.
26. See id. at 1414–53.
27. See id. at 1436–40.
28. See id. at 1433–36.
29. See id. at 1444–53.
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As Cavoukian notes, the premise of privacy by design is to construct
technologies that embody the principles of Fair Information Practices.30
The roadmap to the creation of these technologies is not one that can be
directly specified in the sense that there is a linear set of steps to follow.
This is the specification problem described by Rubinstein.31 The design
of a product (specifically, software) requires the translation of
requirements (e.g., semantic descriptions of functionality) into code that
can be compiled and executed. In the context of a software product team,
such a translation can be facilitated when requirements are precise and
product managers know designers’ limits and capabilities. However,
even in the context of highly skilled teams, the requirements engineering
phase of product design is non-trivial. With regulatory oversight of a
process or design, new requirements engineering challenges emerge.32
Regulatory requirements are often vague, describing a generic process
that can apply to many different types of systems; ensuring compliance
with such a process is often highly challenging.33 As the privacy by
design specifications are inherently generic, translation of these
requirements into design is a significant challenge.
Finally, we call on Rubinstein’s taxonomy of front-end and back-end
technologies when describing the components of a system.34
Rubinstein’s point is clear and important—systems are multi-faceted and
the user experience has many different components.35 Systems are
commonly not built as a cohesive whole, but as parts that are placed
together to accomplish a goal. It is important to think about how a
privacy risk model varies for different components of the system. For
example, a website might have a front end (the website itself) and a back
end (the data store). The risk model for these two components is
different in that privacy attacks or problems can vary substantially. A
formal system, such as a database, has a known universe of threats that
can be guarded systematically. A front end, on the other hand, may
invoke a range of threats, from the social to the technical. The
heterogeneity of these threats makes it harder to apply formal privacy
logics, leading to a potentially greater propensity to design privacy for

30. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 1.
31. See Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1423–31.
32. See Travis D. Breaux & Annie I. Antón, Analyzing Regulatory Rules for Privacy and Security
Requirements, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 5, 5, 17–19 (2008).
33. See id. at 5.
34. See Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1421–31.
35. See id.
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formal systems only.36
Thus, there are many roadblocks to a large-scale adoption of privacy
by design, such as challenges to the demand for, feasibility of, and
technical capacity to implement this approach. This is further
complicated by the nature of privacy, where risks are both endogenous
(that is, the product of a known set of risks inherent to the technology)
and exogenous (the product of external, often unknowable risks) to the
technology.37 We see an illustration of this with social media, where
individuals interact with systems (where endogenous risk can be
known), as well as with other individuals (where exogenous risks
emerge) within the system. This raises privacy challenges that have not
been seen before in other interactive technologies. For this reason, we
use social media as the case we examine in the remainder of this Article.
Externally, conceptualizing privacy within the context of social
technologies in a way that is workable for design-based solutions has
proven elusive.38 As previously mentioned, there is no general
agreement on what the term “privacy” means in a social context, much
less how Internet design can protect it.39 While many scholars and
regulators have agreed that “back end” protections, such as those
provided for in the fair information practices,40 are critical design-based
protections, these background safeguards fail to address the “front end”
of the Internet, which involves user interfaces designed to facilitate
online social interaction.
Social interaction is messy, unpredictable, and contextual with a
vengeance. Consequently, any design rules or guidelines seem destined
either to be inconsistently effective or miss the mark entirely. But the
social web is now too large to exclude from the realm of design-based
solutions. Social network sites like Facebook have over one billion
users.41 Even commercial and news websites are incorporating social
aspects into their user experience.42 Thus, the time has come for design
36. See Gürses, Troncoso & Diaz, supra note 7; Sarah Spiekermann & Lorrie Faith Cranor,
Engineering Privacy, 35 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 67 (2011).
37. See Paul Dourish & Ken Anderson, Collective Information Practice: Exploring Privacy and
Security as Social and Cultural Phenomena, 21 HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 319 (2006).
38. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 4; Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
39. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
40. The FTC has identified the major substantive principles of privacy by design as data security,
reasonable collection limits, sound retention practices, and data accuracy. FTC, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 22–32.
41. See Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
42. See
Community
Forum,
AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/forum/
community?_encoding=UTF8&cdOpenPostBox=1 (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); Community
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guidelines to protect privacy in this social medium.
II.

BETTER LIVING THROUGH OBSCURITY

Most conceptualizations of privacy on the Internet seem to break
down at the social level.43 The concept of privacy is simply too
contextual and vague to meaningfully direct the relevant stakeholders in
design-based decisions to protect Internet users. Instead, this Article
proposes that general design principles to protect users of social
technologies should be based on the concept of obscurity. The following
section explores the concept of online obscurity, summarizing our own
research and that of others on the topic, and why obscurity is the ideal
front-end design principle for online communication technologies like
social network sites.
A.

The Concept of Obscurity

Obscurity is defined as a state of unknowing.44 If an individual is
obscure, this means that an observer does not possess critical
information that allows them to make sense of the individual. This
critical information can include the individual’s identity, social
connections, and other personal information. Without this information,
observers are limited in their ability to fully comprehend an observed
person’s actions and utterances. Employees on a lunch break in a
restaurant often gossip about their co-workers, but this gossip is obscure
to eavesdroppers unless these outsiders know the subject of the gossip;
those in earshot must be able to draw on unspoken contextual
information to make sense of the utterances. This information enables
what Erving Goffman has referred to as “presupposition.”45 Though we
colloquially say we socialize in “public,” in truth our personal
interactions are usually enveloped in zones of obscurity, where our
identity and personal context are shielded to those we interact or share
common space with.
Social media users also have come to rely upon obscurity for privacy
protection online. Obscurity is a natural state offline that users can draw
upon reflexively when protecting their privacy in online social settings.46
Guidelines, NATION, http://www.thenation.com/community-guidelines (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
43. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 4; Grimmelmann, supra note 4; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
44. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 5.
45. See Erving Goffman, Felicity’s Condition, 89 AM. J. SOC. 1, 1 (1983).
46. See, e.g., IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
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For example, the mere act of disclosing information online does not
necessarily mean that the individual seeks wide publicity, even if the
information disclosed is theoretically available to the Internet at large.
Just as an individual shouting from the street corner will only be heard
by so many individuals (her audience is limited by architecture, social
interaction, and pure physics), the rational online discloser has similar
expectations with content shared online.47
The choice to disclose online involves a highly contextual cost/benefit
analysis.48 Individuals control the information disclosed online by
limiting the audience of the disclosure, by limiting the meaning of the
disclosure, and by adapting the disclosure to a particular website.49
Because anonymity would violate norms and limit benefits attained from
many social network sites such as Facebook, individuals instead develop
techniques that effectively produce obscurity in disclosure.50 As
obscurity is a protective, privacy-enhancing state where we are guarded
by an observer’s inability to completely comprehend our action, it is
particularly useful to users of social media tools.
Contrary to the powerful popular discourse that argues that
SPACE, TERRITORY, AND CROWDING (1975); SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY:
DIALECTICS OF DISCLOSURE (2002).
47. For example, numerous papers have documented the characteristics of the “attention
economy” online, where a multitude of information producers compete furiously for limited
attention. To attain large-scale attention requires the expense of significant resources; individuals
who do not seek, or seek limited, publicity have very good reason to expect obscurity. See, e.g.,
MARK NEWMAN, ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI & DUNCAN J. WATTS, THE STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS (2006); Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked
Environment, 46 J. ASS’N COMPUTING MACHINERY 604 (1999).
48. See, e.g., Joseph B. Walther, Selective Self-Presentation in Computer-Mediated
Communication: Hyperpersonal Dimensions of Technology, Language, and Cognition, 23
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAVIOR 2538 (2007).
49. See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ADULTS AND SOCIAL
NETWORK
WEBSITES
(2009),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/272/
report\_display.asp.; AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
TEENS,
PRIVACY
AND
ONLINE
SOCIAL
NETWORKS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/211/report\_display.asp; AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA AND YOUNG ADULTS (2010), available at
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx; Stutzman and Hartzog,
Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 16; Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, Social Cues and Impression
Formation in CMC, 53 J. COMM. 676 (2003).
50. See Joan Morris DiMicco & David R. Millen, Identity Management: Multiple Presentations
of Self in Facebook, in GROUP ‘07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 INTERNATIONAL ACM
CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 383 (2007), available at http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1316682; Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9; see also danah
boyd, Social Steganography: Learning to Hide in Plain Sight, ZEPHORIA (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/08/23/social-steganography-learning-to-hide-inplain-sight.html.
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individuals online have essentially different privacy and notoriety goals,
our previous work “demonstrate[d] that online obscurity is a crucial
aspect of privacy for Internet users.”51 Through obfuscation techniques
and other normative user practices, it is clear that obscurity is both
desired and expected online. “Internet users routinely hide information
by making it invisible to search engines, using pseudonyms and multiple
profiles, and taking advantage of privacy settings.”52 In short, users
produce obscurity online. Thus, obscurity is the ideal locus for designbased solutions that empower users to produce and exist in their own
privacy protective contexts.
B.

The Four Principles of Online Obscurity

Our previous research has offered a clear definition of online
obscurity: “Information is obscure online if it exists in a context missing
one or more key factors that are essential to discovery or comprehension.
We have identified four of these factors: (1) search visibility, (2)
unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. The presence of
these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it.”53 This
Part summarizes that conceptualization with an eye toward design.
Information can be plotted on a spectrum of obscurity that will allow
regulators, designers, and organizational stakeholders to adopt guiding
principles regarding the protection of online information. The aim of
obscurity, as opposed to the broader and more intractable goal of
“privacy,” would provide policymakers and organizational stakeholders
with a more nuanced set of “starting points” that could be applied
flexibly via design-based solutions across culture and context. We now
consider how each of the four factors of obscurity can be approached
through design.
1.

Search Visibility

Search visibility is the degree to which individuals and the content
they produce are locatable and accessible through search.54 Search
invisibility is one of the most significant factors in online obscurity
because it is the primary method for discovering online information.55
51. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 16.
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 48.
54. See id. at 35–36.
55. See, e.g., DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE USE
(2008),
available
at
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/Search-Engine-Use/Data-
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Without search, information can only be discovered in less efficient
ways such as a chain-hyperlink fashion via other websites, messages,
and manual URL entry.
In many ways, search invisibility is already the default for most
online information.56 Search invisibility can be achieved by intentionally
shielding websites from search engines using the robot.txt file as well as
by using privacy settings or other access restrictions such as passwords,
which are another factor in online obscurity.57 Because search is a
primary and common vector for discovery of individual content,
designers should consider offering controls over inclusion in both
internal and external search services. For example, some people may
want their profile to appear in Google, while others would prefer only to
Memo.aspx; SUSANNA FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINES (2002),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2002/Search-Engines/Data-Memo.aspx; LEE
RAINE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, BIG JUMP IN SEARCH ENGINE USE (2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2005/Big-jump-in-search-engine-use/Data-Memo.aspx; Gary
Marchionini, Exploratory Search: From Finding to Understanding, 49 COMM. ACM 41 (2006);
Jamie Teevan, Susan T. Dumais & Eric Horvitz, Potential for Personalization, 17 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-HUM. INTERACTION 1 (2010).
56. This information, collectively known as “the dark Web,” “the deep Web” or “the invisible
Web,” accounts for 80-99% of the World Wide Web. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BERGMAN, THE DEEP
WEB: SURFACING HIDDEN VALUE (2001), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=jep;view=text;rgn=main;idno=3336451.0007.104 (“Since they are missing the deep Web
when they use such search engines, Internet searchers are therefore searching only 0.03%—or one
in 3,000—of the pages available to them today.”); Norm Medeiros, Reap What You Sow:
Harvesting the Deep Web, 18 OCLC SYS. & SERV. 18 (2002); Yanbo Ru & Ellis Horowitz,
Indexing the Invisible Web: A Survey, 29 ONLINE INFO. REV. 249 (2005); Andy Beckett, The Dark
Side of the Internet, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/
nov/26/dark-side-internet-freenet; Danny Devriendt, Data is Gold – 91,000 Terabytes of Uncharted
Web: Welcome to the Dark Side, PORTER NOVELLI BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://blog.porternovelli.com/2011/04/11/data-is-gold-%E2%80%93-91000-terabytes-of-unchartedweb-welcome-to-the-dark-side/ (“The dark Web, or hidden Web is approximately 550 times bigger
than the Web you experience daily.”); Russell Kay, Quickstudy: Deep Web, COMPUTERWORLD
(Dec. 15, 2005, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/107097/Deep_Web (“[M]ore
than 500 times as much information as traditional search engines ‘know about’ is available in the
deep Web.”); see also PAUL PEDLEY, THE INVISIBLE WEB: SEARCHING THE HIDDEN PARTS OF THE
INTERNET (2001); CHRIS SHERMAN & GARY PRICE, THE INVISIBLE WEB: UNCOVERING
INFORMATION SOURCES SEARCH ENGINES CAN’T SEE (2001).
57. For example, the popular blogging service Blogger allows users to make their blog invisible
to Google. See “Listing” and “Let Search Engines find your Blog” Settings, GOOGLE.COM,
http://www.google.com/support/blogger/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=41373 (last visited Apr. 27,
2011). Facebook profiles that utilize privacy settings are also not found by search engines. See How
Can I Control if Other Search Engines can Link to My Timeline?, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/392235220834308/ (last visited May 6, 2011); see also Jonathan
Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 102 (2008) (“Today, nearly all Web programmers
know robots.txt is the way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions
are voluntarily respected by every major search engine across differing cultures and legal
jurisdictions.”).
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be “searchable” one or two network degrees out (e.g., by friends-offriends). Designers may also consider offering various levels of search
engine obfuscation, where only certain aspects of the profile are placed
into search, or search placement is manipulated to raise or lower
placement of results. Design options are discussed in greater detail in
Part III below.
2.

Unprotected Access

Access protection covers a range of technologies and methods for
controlling access to content.58 A common example of an access control
is the password. Access controls can serve multiple functions apart from
merely technologically restricting who can view information. Access
controls can also serve as normative signals indicating the private nature
of the information. Conversely, unfettered access to information,
particularly when technologies like privacy settings are available but
unused, can have the opposite effect on obscurity, leaving the
information exposed and subject to being scraped, indexed, and
aggregated.
There are many different kinds of access controls, including
biometrics, encryption, privacy settings, and passwords. These controls
can provide for user control over several variables, including the content
shared, the specifics of the potential audience, or both. As ubiquitous
computing systems change and adoption increases, dynamically
generated access controls are likely to evolve—controls that are reactive
to the environment and its network configurations.59 Along with search
visibility, access controls are one of the most important factors to create
online obscurity. Consequently, they should be considered bedrock tools
for designers embracing the principals of obscurity.
3.

Identification

Identification refers to the degree that individuals are identified
through personal and interpersonal disclosures in online settings.
Identification is defined here as the existence of an irrefutable piece of
information that links content online to the individual’s person.
58. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 9, at 37–38.
59. See, e.g., Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer
Interaction, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 137 (2007); Maomao Wu,
Adaptive Privacy Management for Distributed Applications (June 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Lancaster University), available at http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/12984/1/PhdThesisMaomaoWu.pdf.
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Information that cannot be linked to a person offers a degree of
anonymity and poses a reduced threat to that person’s privacy.60 While
many PETs and other design strategies focus on anonymity,61 obscurity
is much more concerned with the use of pseudonyms and ID variants
given their utility in socialization. Like passwords, ID variants and
pseudonyms can somewhat protectively de-link content and identity.
Readily apparent ID variants and pseudonym can also signal to the
recipient of information that the identity of the discloser is sensitive or
private.
Social technologies present multiple challenges to identity
management. For example, on social network sites, where the
articulation of the social network is a key feature, identification can
occur through both direct and indirect disclosures.62 Users maintaining a
pseudonymous profile may become publicly identifiable based on whom
the individual connects to, or what a friend writes on the individual’s
wall.63 Therefore, designers should be aware that the individual’s
intention to protect her or his identity extends beyond self-disclosure to
managing disclosures about the individual and selective crafting of the
online persona.
4.

Clarity

Finally, clarity covers the degree to which an outside observer can
make sense of content shared by an individual.64 Often, online
information is easily discoverable, but important aspects of that
information do not make sense to the reader or viewer.65 Sometimes this
information is intentionally vague or incomplete. Information in one
domain might be separated by medium, tool, or linkage from another
piece in order to make it more obscure, and, thus, more protected.66 If
information is too vague or incomplete to understand, it lacks clarity.67
60. See Iachello & Hong, supra note 59, at 2–3.
61. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1411, 1415.
62. See J. Donath & d. boyd, Public Displays of Connection, 22 BT TECH. J. 71 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Remarks at the 30th IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy: De-anonymizing Social Networks (May 17–20 2009), in 2009 IEEE
SYMPOSIUM ON SEC. & PRIVACY, 2009, at 173–87 (abstract available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5207644&isnumber=5207632).
64. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 39.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9.
67. See Clarity Definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/
dictionary/american/clarity#clarity_3 (last visited May 30, 2013).
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Whereas the identification factor of obscurity focuses on the link
between identity and information, clarity focuses on the link between
content and some other contextual factor. Stripping context from
information reduces its clarity and increases the obscurity of information
by reducing the number of people who are likely to understand the
meaning of the disclosure. This technique is common in our everyday
social interactions. Groups that are familiar with each other can
“presuppose” contexts in conversation, instead of explicitly providing
for it with each disclosure.68 In our previous research, we conceptualized
“clarity” as the “range of shared social, cultural, and linguistic factors
that enable presupposition.”69 The previously mentioned eavesdroppers
on gossip may be able to understand some of what is spoken aloud, but
there will likely be a lack of clarity that prohibits true comprehension or
identification of the conversational subjects. The same can be said for
communication via social technologies, which is often clouded by ingroup presuppositions that inhibit clarity.70
Designers can approach clarity by both recognizing and valuing
individual strategies for managing clarity (i.e., respecting this normative
practice in both policy and technology), and by considering the degree to
which meta-data, data stores, and data recombination allows outside
individuals to programmatically construct clarity of observed
information.71 Such considerations are especially important given the
risks to persons (e.g., job security, safety) that can emerge from
inadvertent disclosures.
Obscurity is capable of being easier to refine and implement than the
broader concept of privacy. Where the pursuit of “privacy” in design
often seems like a quest for near-perfect protection, the goal of designing
for obscurity is that it be good enough for most contexts or a user’s
specific needs. Protection is achieved via obscurity not necessarily
through the strength of the “armor,” but rather, through a significant
reduction in the probability of discovering or understanding information.
Obscurity is a more nuanced and accurate reflection of the expectations
of users of social technologies than the broader, and potentially
misleading, concept of privacy.72

68. Goffman, supra note 45, at 1.
69. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 39.
70. See, e.g., Tanis & Postmes, supra note 49; Walther, supra note 48.
71. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Fred Stutzman, Privacy in an Age of
Augmented Reality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
72. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9, at 31–40.
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III. IMPLEMENTING OBSCURITY BY DESIGN
This Article has proposed that obscurity is the natural state for most
online social communications and, as such, should be the locus of
design-based privacy solutions for social technologies. This part
explores how the various organizational stakeholders can work together
to create a model of “obscurity by design” for social technologies.
Specifically, this part explores ways to implement obscurity by design
through technologies, policies, and behavioral interventions. These
implementations would enable and encourage users to create or maintain
a context of obscurity.
It is important to note the role of design and designers within this
conceptualization. Those actually tasked with the nuts and bolts of
assembling social technologies, such as product managers, designers,
and software engineers, will be crucial in designing for obscurity. Given
obscurity by design’s focus on the “front end” or user interface of social
technologies, these design teams will play an extremely important role in
implementing policy goals.
But a successful scheme of privacy by design must include all of the
relevant stakeholders in an organization, including the legal counsel who
drafts a technology’s terms of use and privacy policy, and the higherlevel decision makers who set the goals and basic parameters of the
technology. While different organizational stakeholders might claim
responsibility for the ultimate implementation of various technologies,
policies, and nudges, a true obscurity by design approach should attempt
to bring together all of the organizational stakeholders to coordinate the
implementation process. Indeed, complete organizational responsibility
is one of the central tenets of privacy by design.73
Of course, obscurity is not the only desired goal of privacy protection
in social technologies. Some communication, like information on
publicity-seeking blogs and some Twitter accounts, need little protection
and are unlikely to be viewed as private or obscure in most instances.
Obscurity would actually be a hindrance to those seeking widespread
publicity.74 Other communications, such as sensitive health information
and extremely intimate disclosures about personal relationships, would
likely require more protection than obscurity, and thus the desired level

73. See Cavoukian, Privacy by Design, supra note 1, at 1.
74. For those seeking to make a living by writing and publishing information, obscurity is
actually an obstacle to overcome. See, e.g., CORY DOCTOROW, THE PROBLEM ISN’T PIRACY, THE
PROBLEM IS OBSCURITY (Children’s Book Insider ed., 2011), available at
http://www.write4kids.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/doctorow.pdf.
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of protection should be confidentiality or secrecy.75 Optimally, users
should be able to adjust their level of protection from the obscurity
default to achieve either more publicity or greater confidentiality or
secrecy.
Indeed, many of the proposals to implement obscurity by design can
also serve the interests of the more protective concepts of confidentiality
or secrecy. Alternatively, some of these proposals can also serve as a
transitional tool that helps ensure a gradual, controlled, and layered
approach to publicity, rather than a meteoric ascent into fame—
metaphorical speed bumps for online communication. Thus, these
proposals are pliable and capable of effectuating a number of different
policy goals.
A.

Technologies

Perhaps the most obvious way to design for obscurity is to create
technologies that directly produce obscurity or enable users to produce
obscurity for themselves. These technologies can include, but are not
limited to, PETs such as the option to hide individual content from
internal and external search engines.76 In social media, friendship,
follower status, or group status generally govern access. In blogs or
websites, either credentials (such as passwords) or encryption govern
access. Following this logic, smart hyperlinks and privacy settings could
restrict access to various degrees and, by doing so, raise the transactional
cost of finding information and making that information more obscure.
Such high costs decrease the likelihood that information will be found
and used in harmful ways.
1.

Smart Hyperlinks and Access Walls

Consider the case where an individual would like to semi-privately
share content without passwords or social network connections. Through
the use of cookies, a “paywall”-like technology could be designed to
only accept links from certain sources restricting access to content.77 For
example, a link might not lead to the correct page unless the user clicked
75. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The Privacy Box: A Software Proposal, FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 2,
2009), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFriendly/2682/2361.
76. See, e.g., Spiekermann & Cranor, supra note 36.
77. Of course, paywall technologies are both controversial and subject to circumvention. But
increasing the labor required to access information is another way to lower the probability of
discovery. See, e.g., Tim Brookes, 5 Ways to Get Around the New York Times Paywall,
MAKEUSEOF (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/5-ways-york-times-paywall/.
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it while within a protected online community or if certain cookies
existed on the user’s computer authorizing the disclosure.78
Alternatively, the link might work only when the web server can confirm
that the link is embedded within a certain webpage.
These “smart hyperlinks” could help ensure that only members of the
protected community or other verified users could access the
information. Additionally, these links would help maintain the obscurity
of information by frustrating the ease of dissemination online.79 Most
links are easily shared through being cut and pasted into e-mails or
social media postings. These smart links would require the extra step of
manually disseminating the information itself, rather than the hyperlink.
While such a technique might not adequately protect confidential or
secret information, it would likely help obscure information by reducing
the number of people likely to disseminate it.80 While not perfect, this
flexible approach could meaningfully help enable selective disclosure.
2.

“Privacy” Settings

Some of the most common tools to help users produce obscurity are
privacy settings.81 These settings, which generally allow Internet users to
control the potential audience of their disclosures on a website, are often
criticized as not protecting privacy at all because hundreds, if not
thousands, can regularly still have access to “protected” disclosures.82
This critique highlights the problems with relying upon
conceptualizations of privacy to guide design.
78. It should be noted that there are privacy implications regarding the use of cookies, but these
threats are better addressed by other strategies within privacy by design and are beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy (University of California,
Berkley, Working Paper, Aug. 10, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862; Joseph Turow et al., Contrary to What Marketers Say, Americans
Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It (Working Paper, Sep. 29, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478214.
79. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
80. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 43.
81. MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, REPUTATION
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA 29 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.aspx (finding that “[n]early three quarters (71%) of social
networking users ages 18-29 have changed the privacy settings on their profile to limit what they
share with others online”).
82. See, e.g., Loporcaro v. City of New York, No. 100406/10, 2012 WL 1231021, at *7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012) (“When a person creates a Facebook account, he or she may be found to have
consented to the possibility that personal information might be shared with others, notwithstanding
his or her privacy settings, as there is no guarantee that the pictures and information posted thereon,
whether personal or not, will not be further broadcast and made available to other members of the
public.”).
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These technologies are likely better understood as “obscurity
settings.” They help the user hide from search engines and control who
accesses their personal information, two of the most important factors of
our conceptualization of online obscurity. Previous research supports the
assertion that Internet users utilize privacy settings for numerous reasons
such as propriety, audience management, and obscurity.83 These settings
can serve as bedrock technologies to enable obscurity and would likely
be a staple for obscurity by design for social technologies.
3.

Search Blockers

Because one of the main factors that enables obscurity is search
invisibility, technologies that keep websites from being indexed by
search engines are highly effective ways to design for obscurity.
Previously discussed technologies such as password systems, privacy
settings, and paywall-like technologies serve dual purposes of restricting
access as well as keeping certain pieces of information from being
cataloged by search engines.84
However, other technologies can also serve this function. The
robot.txt file85 is a simple and effective way for websites to indicate nonparticipation in search engines.86 Search invisibility can be woven into
the design of social technologies. For example, the popular blog creation
tool Tumblr, allows users to hide their blogs from search engines.87 On
the settings page for any particular blog, users can reverse this result by
checking a box to indicate the user’s desire to “[a]llow search engines to
index your blog.”88
Designers might also consider offering various levels of search engine
obfuscation, where only certain aspects of a profile or website are placed
into search. Designers could make information searchable only at the
83. See, e.g., Stutzman & Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9.
84. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
85. According to Google, “A robots.txt file restricts access to your site by search engine robots
that crawl the web. These bots are automated, and before they access pages of a site, they check to
see if a robots.txt file exists that prevents them from accessing certain pages.” Block or Remove
Pages Using a Robot.txt File, GOOGLE.COM, http://support.google.com/webmasters/bin/
answer.py?hl=en&answer=156449 (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
86. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 57, at 102 (“Today, nearly all Web programmers know
robots.txt is the way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and these intentions are
voluntarily respected by every major search engine across differing cultures and legal
jurisdictions.”).
87. See, e.g., Ashley Poland, Can You Restrict Ages on Tumblr?, EHOW (June 29, 2011),
http://www.ehow.com/info_8665566_can-restrict-ages-tumblr.html.
88. Id.
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site level but remain invisible to general search engines. Search engine
optimization techniques could be inverted to lower the placement of
certain results, a sort of search engine diminishment. Any combination
of technology and strategy to diminish or erase search engine visibility
of information would count as a valid implementation of obscurity by
design.
4.

De-Identifying Tools

Facial recognition technology is evolving rapidly.89 It is only a matter
of time before individuals in photographs and videos online can be
automatically identified.90 “Augmented reality,” that is, “a live, direct or
indirect, view of a physical, real-world environment whose elements are
augmented by computer-generated sensory input such as sound, video,
graphics or GPS data,” will continue to find its way into social
technologies.91 The identities of individuals in online media are often
obscure because they are not included in the search results for the
individuals’ names. Post hoc identification of these individuals would
destroy the obscurity they enjoyed with regard to these videos and
images. Thus, any technology that frustrated facial recognition and other
identification tools would effectuate obscurity by design.
For example, Google has announced plans to implement a technology
that allows users to blur the faces of those appearing in videos before
posting them to YouTube.92 The tool has been envisioned as another
option for dealing with privacy complaints submitted by people depicted
in another user’s videos. In addition to the more severe consequence of
video deletion due to privacy complaints, video creators will also have
the option to blur the complainant’s face, which will allow the videos to
remain on YouTube.93
While face-blurring might still leave individuals subject to
identification in some contexts, this technique could have two positive

89. See, e.g., Megan Geuss, Facebook Facial Recognition: Its Quiet Rise and Dangerous Future,
PCWORLD (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/226228/Facerec.html.
90. See id.; Acquisti et al., supra note 71; Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, Why Facebook’s Facial
Recognition is Creepy, PCWORLD (June 8, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/229742/
why_facebooks_facial_recognition_is_creepy.html.
91. Augmented Reality, MASHABLE, http://mashable.com/follow/topics/augmented-reality/ (last
visited May 1, 2012); see also Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The
Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676 (2012).
92. See Thomas Claburn, YouTube Tool Blurs Faces to Protect Privacy, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 29,
2012), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/232700524.
93. Id.
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outcomes for obscurity: (1) only those with external knowledge of
individuals with blurred faces would likely be able to identify them,
effectively protecting the individual from recognition by most strangers,
and (2) blurred faces will frustrate facial recognition technologies. As
such, these technologies would help implement obscurity by design.
5.

Passwords and Encryption

Some technologies, such as password systems and encryption, can
clearly obscure disclosures because these tools can significantly restrict
outsider access and thus raise the transactional cost of finding
information. Indeed, these technologies can often protect more than the
obscurity of information—they can keep information a secret that is
unknown or unseen by others. While designers should always be willing
to consider these powerful tools, they should be mindful regarding their
implementation for the front end of social technologies (as opposed to
back-end or in-transit uses like “https” or encrypting electronic
messages, which are important aspects of privacy by design).94 Too
many restrictions on the accessibility of disclosures might unduly inhibit
social interaction and frustrate the purpose of the technology.
B.

Policies

Not all technology design decisions relate to the creation and
implementation of tools. The creation and protection of obscurity can
also be facilitated by rules that explicitly allow or discourage certain
behavior. Terms of use and policies can allow users to create their own
obscurity, for example by using a pseudonym, as well as prevent other
social technology users from engaging in obscurity-eroding behavior,
such as scraping data from websites. These policies generally fall into
two categories: behavioral restrictions, which are largely imposed to
govern the user’s behavior in relation to the technology, and community
guidelines, which are imposed as the “rules of the road” between users
within an online community.
1.

Contractual Restrictions on User Behavior
Terms of use agreements in technologies like social media commonly

94. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, A Privacy Manifesto in Code: What if Your Emails Never Went
to Gmail and Twitter Couldn’t See Your Tweets?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/12/04/a-privacy-manifesto-in-code-what-if-youremails-never-went-to-gmail-and-twitter-couldnt-see-your-tweets/255414/.
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include restrictions on user behavior. These restrictions, such as
prohibitions on scraping data and requesting one’s user name and
password, can prevent other individuals (and bots) from diminishing a
technology user’s obscurity. Other policies, such as the requirement that
social media users list their real name, can frustrate a user’s obscurity
protections. Policies that discourage activities that erode obscurity and
encourage obscurity-friendly behavior should be considered an
implementation of obscurity by design. Because lack of identification is
a major factor in online obscurity, designers should construct policies
and technologies that allow for pseudonyms, name variants, and/or the
use of multiple profiles to represent multiple facets of identity. Indeed,
Google+, the search giant’s social media platform, has already modified
its terms to allow the use of some pseudonyms.95 This development
occurred as part of the so-called “nym-wars,” which brought attention to
the importance of pseudonymity.96 Other social network sites have “real
name” policies that require strong identification of site members through
norms, and sometimes through enforcement action.97 These policies are
controversial as the requirement of real names can disenfranchise a wide
range of users (e.g., victims of abuse, political opposition) who face
threats if they speak publicly with their “real names.”98 Some users
simply want to bifurcate their online identity by creating two different
social media profiles.99 Multiple profiles produce obscurity by de-linking
aspects of an individual’s identity. Yet this practice is also prohibited by
some social network websites, including Facebook.100 Real name
policies and prohibitions on multiple profiles can help verify one’s
online identity, but these practices significantly diminish obscurity by
95. See Eva Galperin, Google+ and Pseudonyms: A Step in the Right Direction, Not the End of
the Road, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/
google-pseudonyms-step-right-direction-not-end-road.
96. See Eva Galperin, 2011 in Review: Nymwars, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26,
2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/12/2011-review-nymwars.
97. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Rights] (“Facebook users
provide their real names and information, and we need your help to keep it that way. Here are some
commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your
account: . . . You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook . . . .”).
98. See Jillian C. York, A Case for Pseudonyms, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 29, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/case-pseudonyms.
99. See, e.g., Stutzman and Hartzog, Boundary Regulation, supra note 9 (finding that users often
use multiple profiles for “personal” and “professional” separation).
100. Statement of Rights, supra note 97 (“Here are some commitments you make to us relating to
registering and maintaining the security of your account: . . . You will not create more than one
personal account.”).
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design.
Restrictions on revealing one’s username and password can also help
create obscurity, as well as security, by functioning as a nontechnological burden on accessing information. One of the easier ways
of accessing a user’s social media profile is to do so directly via requests
for one’s username and password. Third-party requests for social media
user’s passwords are seemingly on the rise.101 However, as part of the
registration process, Facebook and other social network sites require
promises such as “[y]ou will not share your password . . . let anyone else
access your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize the
security of your account.”102
Designers can protect the obscurity of their users’ information by
prohibiting scraping.103 In the obscurity context, scraping restrictions are
a form of access control against automated information harvesting.104
Essentially, these restrictions mandate that, for most purposes, only
humans can access online information, as opposed to bots. This
restriction helps produce obscurity by limiting the aggregation and
further dissemination to “manual” methods, which are more time
consuming and less likely to present systematic risks to privacy.
Information harvesting typically results in aggregation of information,
which associates information that was previously separate. This
separation prevented certain kinds of presupposition crucial to
understanding individuals and information.105 In other words,

101. For example, in September 2007, a cheerleading coach at Pearl High School in Mississippi
allegedly required the members of her cheerleading squad to reveal the usernames and passwords of
their Facebook accounts. Brian Stewart, Student Files Lawsuit After Coach Distributed Private
Facebook
Content,
STUDENT
PRESS
L.
CENTER
(July
22,
2009),
http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1938; cf. David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses
Barred from Eyeing Students’, Workers’ Social Media, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2012, 3:10 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
site_unseen_schools_bosses_barred_from_eyeing_students_workers_social_media.
102. Statement of Rights, supra note 97.
103. See, e.g., id. (“You will not collect users’ content or information, or otherwise access
Facebook, using automated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our
prior permission.”).
104. Automated information harvesting by third parties also threatens individuals’ obscurity and
is typically governed via terms of use. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62
(1st Cir. 2003) (“Many webpages contain lengthy limiting conditions, including limitations on the
use of scrapers.”). “Web Scraping is the process of taking html or data from the web and organizing
that data into an organized format . . . . Common uses for web scraping is the gathering and retrieval
of large amounts of information that would be to unwieldy to gather by hand.” Web Scraping
Definition, EXTRACTINGDATA.COM, http://www.extractingdata.com/web%20scraping.htm (last
visited Aug. 10, 2010).
105. See, e.g., Goffman, supra note 45.
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aggregating information can often clarify it, which makes that
information more obvious and less obscure.
A number of social technologies have already incorporated this
design principle. Facebook mandates that visitors “will not collect users’
content or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using automated
means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our
prior permission.”106 It goes on to state that “[i]f you collect information
from users, you will: obtain their consent, make it clear you (and not
Facebook) are the one collecting their information, and post a privacy
policy explaining what information you collect and how you will use
it.”107
2.

Community Guidelines

While “behavior restrictions” provide rules for the relationship
between the user and the website, terms of use agreements and website
policies also have the opportunity to serve as a mediator of conduct
between the users of online communities. These “rules of the road” for
online social interaction are often called “community guidelines,”108
and—in addition to contractually restricting behavior—they can
potentially help set the normative expectations for online communities.
These rules of the road need not be in the terms of use agreement to
be effective from a design perspective. Indeed, because virtually nobody
reads the terms of use, inserting community guidelines into boilerplate
will all but assure their ineffectiveness.109 Instead, these guidelines
should be made prominent at the point of disclosure to gently remind
members of the community of what the normatively expected behavior
is. For example, a small textual box next to a status-posting tool in a
social network site might incorporate language from the website’s terms
of use, such as, “Remember, this is a community that relies upon
discretion” or “Let’s keep what we learn here between members of the
106. Statement of Rights, supra note 97.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Flickr Community Guidelines, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/help/guidelines/
(last visited May 1, 2012); MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE,
http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms?pm_cmp=ed_footer (last visited June 25, 2009); The Twitter
Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules (last visited May 1,
2012);
YouTube
Community
Guidelines,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/t/
community_guidelines (last visited May 1, 2012) (“We’re not asking for the kind of respect
reserved for nuns, the elderly, and brain surgeons. We mean don’t abuse the site. Every cool new
community feature on YouTube involves a certain level of trust. We trust you to be responsible, and
millions of users respect that trust. Please be one of them.”).
109. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011).
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community.”
Community guidelines should not be in legalese. They should be
short and easy to understand.110 Designers could experiment with
various levels of formality and injunctions of humor to determine the
most effective way to inform users of the rules. Designers also have the
option of implementing the guidelines normatively or incorporating
them into their terms of use as part of a contractually binding agreement.
For example, the online photo community of Flickr provides very
simple community guidelines, many of which enhance obscurity.111
Under “What not to do,” Flickr reminds users, “Don’t forget the
children,” saying “If you would hesitate to show your photos or videos
to a child, your mum, or Uncle Bob, that means you need to set the
appropriate content filter setting. If you don’t, your account will be
moderated and possibly deleted by Flickr staff.”112 The content filter is a
technological control that can affect access and is a great way to blend
design tools to create obscurity. The website also uses humor to enforce
civility and respect for the community, stating, “Don’t be creepy. You
know the guy. Don’t be that guy.”113
C.

Behavioral Interventions

Modern behavioral economics and social psychology have
demonstrated that small design decisions can have a significant impact
on an individual’s behavior.114 To effectuate obscurity by design, we
recommend drawing from these disciplines to provide instruction on
how, in the parlance of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, to “nudge”
users toward obscurity-friendly practices.115 We refer to design decisions
made to encourage obscurity-friendly practices as behavioral
interventions.
110. Cf. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J.
L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008).
111. See Flickr Community Guidelines, supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011); CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tverskey, eds., 2000); see also Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or
Notice? (Feb. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217013.
115. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). Thaler and Sunstein conceptualize a “nudge” as “any
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a nudge, the
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates.” Id.
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These behavioral interventions could work in tandem with or in place
of technologies and policies to gently enhance user obscurity in social
technologies without mandating conduct or precluding certain kinds of
activity. It is important to emphasize that, consistent with the thesis of
this Article, these interventions are offered not as excessive protections
to limit user behavior, but rather as clarifications and corrective
measures that help users understand and effectuate the true and desired
state of their online communications.
1.

Defaults

There may be no more central tenet to obscurity by design and
privacy by design as a whole than the importance of privacy-friendly
default settings.116 Indeed, the issue of defaults for consumers and
technology users is important in other areas of privacy law.117 The
reason why the default setting is such a critical design decision is that
individuals will usually stick with whatever the default choice is, even
when the default is less advantageous or more harmful than the nondefault options.118 This power of inertia and general reluctance of
individuals to alter default choices has been called “status quo bias.”119
Default settings can even be seen as an implicit endorsement from the
default setter that the settings are desirable.120 Thus, it is extremely
important to consider the proper default setting for social technologies
and implement the most responsible choice.
We have argued that, for most social technologies, obscurity is the
natural context for the disclosure of personal information. Consequently,
any organization seeking to adhere to the principles of obscurity by
design should set their default choices for users in the most obscurityfriendly way available. For example, if a social technology offers
privacy settings, the settings should, at a minimum, default to render

116. See CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, supra note 1; CAVOUKIAN, SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1.
116. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2.
117. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193 (1998); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999).
118. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 8.
119. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
120. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer
Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 603 (2006) (“[P]eople believe
defaults convey information on how people should act.”).
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disclosures invisible from search and limit other user’s access in some
significant way (i.e., not offer unfettered access).
2.

Feedback

Designing feedback mechanisms into social technologies might be
one of the most powerful behavioral interventions available to
implement obscurity by design. Feedback can be effective for a number
of reasons, including helping make risks more salient and appealing to
individuals’ desire for conformity.121
One kind of feedback that might be effective for designers could be a
form of what Professor Ryan Calo calls “visceral notice,” notice that is
visceral “in the sense of changing the consumers understanding by
leveraging the very experience of a product or service.”122 Feedback
could be categorized as “showing,” or “tailoring notice very specifically
to the company’s engagement with the exact individual.”123 Calo states
“[t]echnology and clever design create the possibility of tailoring
anecdotes to individual consumers, thereby showing them what is
specifically relevant to them, instead of describing generally what might
be.”124
As an example, Calo describes how Mozilla, the designer of the
popular Firefox browser, “shows” users their privacy practices by
providing the user feedback on what information is collected by the
browser.
Consistent with standard legal practice, Mozilla provides a

121. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 613 (2000) (“The tendency of individuals to conform—a
phenomenon psychologists call ‘social influence’—is pervasive: diners prefer to patronize the
restaurants that they think other diners will patronize, and citizens to vote for the candidates for
whom they think others will vote; teenage girls are more likely to become pregnant when they see
that others are having babies, and adults more likely to go on welfare when they become acquainted
with others who are on the dole.”); Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of
Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1629 (2006) (“The main
vehicle to greater decision-making competence is alteration in existing psychological states such
that later psychological states possess more reliable knowledge about what ends are most valued
and how best to achieve those ends. Outcome feedback and verbal feedback serve as the main
mechanisms for change between earlier and later psychological states.”).
122. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1033 (2012).
123. Id. at 1042. For preliminary results regarding an experiment that measures, among other
things, “showing” as a notice technique, see Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the
Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study (Sept. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1993125.
124. Calo, supra note 122, at 1042.
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privacy policy and terms of use that explain, generally, what
information Mozilla might collect and how it might use that
information. About one study, Mozilla says: “We will
periodically collect data on the browser’s basic performance for
one week . . . .” Prior to transmitting user information from the
user’s computer to Mozilla’s servers, however, Mozilla also
shows users a report of what information has actually been
collected and asks them to review and approve it. Thus, users
actually see a specific, relevant instance of collection and decide
to consent on this basis.125
Calo concludes, “Executed well, showing describes what has actually
occurred, thereby embedding information about the company’s practices
in the consumer experience of the produce or service—similar to the
way we might best learn the rules of a game by playing it.”126
Social technologies provide abundant opportunities for feedback
through “showing” users aspects of their social network or interactivity
that might encourage obscurity-friendly practices. For example, showing
users the size of their potential audience or five randomly selected
“friends” at the point of disclosure might help users better understand
the scope of the contemplated disclosure and, thus, the potential
consequences of communication. This salience could lead to a disclosure
to a smaller audience or within the confines of certain groups or privacy
settings.
Some social technologies have already utilized this technique. For
example, the professional social network site LinkedIn shows users who
recently viewed their profile.127 Shown in proximity to incipient but
unpublished disclosures, these design features could serve to enhance
obscurity-friendly practices such as encouraging users to be less explicit
regarding personal information or to obfuscate the identity of the subject
of the disclosure.
Designers could also combine our innate desire for conformity with
feedback from the user’s social graph to encourage obscurity friendly
practices.128 Although human beings might think they are uninfluenced
by the behavior of their peers, empirical research demonstrates that
people often simply conform to the behavior of others.129 Thaler and
125. Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 1044.
127. Who’s Viewed Your Profile?, LINKEDIN,
pop_more_wvmp (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).

http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=pop/

128. See Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 9.
129. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the
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Sunstein proposed that if many people within a particular community or
“in group” are engaging in some kind of positive behavior (such as
exercising), merely mentioning that fact to other members of the group
might be able to produce significant changes in the other members’
behavior.130
Given our tendency to look to other users of social technology for
behavioral cues, designers could use statistics to encourage obscurityfriendly behavior. For example, designers could show users how many
of their friends have utilized the privacy settings. Facebook already
leverages the user’s social graph by displaying how many mutual friends
two “unconnected” users have.131 Designers can implement these same
kinds of cues to enhance obscurity at a low cost.
3.

Content, Ordering, and Placement of Signals

Language and interactive features of websites often carry more
weight than designers might intend. Organizations seeking to implement
obscurity by design should be mindful that small changes in the
prominence and number of instances of obscurity-related signals such as
language emphasizing obscurity, privacy settings, options to hide from
search engines and pseudonym policies, can have a significant effect on
obscurity-friendly practices and user decisions.
Individuals often rely too much on a particular trait or piece of
information when making decisions.132 These overvalued pieces of
information have been referred to as “anchors” because they become the
starting points toward which decisions become biased.133 Effective
obscurity by design should optimize the placement of language and
signals during the average user experience because they might become
anchors for users and thus serve as behavioral interventions.
One form of this tactic has come to be known as a “just-in-time” alert
and is supported as a valid “privacy by design” technique by the FTC.134
United States, 111 Q. J. ECON. 277 (1996); Bruce Sacerdote, Peer Effects with Random Assignment:
Results for Dartmouth Roommates, 116 Q. J. ECON. 681 (2001).
130. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 60.
131. See What Are Friendship Pages?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
220629401299124/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
132. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); cf. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, The Limits of
Anchoring, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 223 (1994).
133. See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 132.
134. See FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 15–16; see also Lauren Gelman,
FTC Recommends Best Practices for Mobile Privacy, BLURRYEDGE STRATEGIES (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://blurryedge.com/blurryedge-strategies/2013/02/ftc-recommends-best-practices-for-mobile-
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According to the Commission, “[p]roviding such a disclosure at the
point in time when it matters to consumers, just prior to the collection of
such information by apps, will allow users to make informed choices
about whether to allow the collection of such information.”135 The tech
giant Apple has deployed just-in-time-disclosures in some aspects of its
iOS6 operating system to obtain affirmative express consent for
collection of personal information.136
With respect to just-in-time disclosures for social technologies,
companies could introduce privacy settings early in the profile creation
process and again at the point of disclosure. Designers could make the
settings or language of privacy visible in the toolbar or the top of the
homepage to increase awareness throughout the user experience.
Companies could emphasize that pseudonyms are allowed before a
profile name is chosen. These strategies could increase the likelihood
that obscurity is a relevant anchor for users as they go about the process
of selecting both content and audience.
Prominent and frequent obscurity-related signals could also combat
people’s tendency to assess risk using the most conveniently accessible
example. This phenomenon has been labeled the “availability
heuristic.”137 Reminding individuals of the obscurity in which their
disclosures exist could help them properly gauge when to disclose
further and when to curtail sharing.
Finally, prominent signals that remind users of the negative
consequences of losing obscurity might help individuals be less forgetful
of their potential audience. For example, users seeking to post a
profanity-laden status update rife with personal information might be
gently reminded that their co-workers, employer, or even their
grandmother will be able to view the post. Users could then be given the
option to tailor their update to a more discreet group.138 Or designers
could include very simple reminders at the point of disclosure explaining
to users that their post will be available to anyone via search engines.

privacy.html.
135. FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES, supra note 11, at 15.
136. See id. at 16.
137. Tversky & Daniel, supra note 132, at 1127 (“There are situations in which people assess the
frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences
can be brought to mind.”).
138. Longtime users of word-processing software Microsoft Word might analogize such a
guidance tool to “Clippy,” the anthropomorphized paper-clip who asked if the Word users would
like help when recognized user behavior associated with specific tasks. Of course, like Clippy,
obscurity-reminders should also be easily disabled by the user.
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Carefully Crafted Language

Finally, any effective implementation of obscurity by design should
reflect an understanding of the power of framing to influence user
decisions. The way that an issue like obscurity is framed by the
designer’s choice of language could have a significant effect on a user’s
disclosure decisions. Robert Entman stated, “To frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described.”139 In essence, “Frames
highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a
communication, thereby elevating them in salience.”140
One of the most widely cited examples of the power of framing
involves an experiment by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The
experiment involved a significant number of participants who were each
presented with statistically identical treatment options for a hypothetical
disease. The treatment options, however, were framed differently to
individual participants in terms of either likely deaths versus probable
lives saved. The experiment showed that a significant number of
participants’ understanding of the problem, as well as their ultimate
choice of treatment, changed depending on how the treatment option
was framed.141
Obscurity can easily be framed as a positive or negative as well as a
gain or a loss. Social technologies are designed for interaction and, as
previously discussed, some might view obscurity as a hindrance to
socialization. Thus, organizations seeking to implement obscurity by
design could proactively address the conceptualization by framing
obscurity as, we believe correctly, the natural state for most online
socialization, as well as something to be “lost” if not protected.
When appropriate, framing obscurity as something the user already
has and is subject to losing allows designers to leverage people’s natural
tendency to overvalue things they already have.142 Thaler and Sunstein
wrote, “People hate losses . . . . Roughly speaking, losing something

139. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM.
51, 52 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
140. Id. at 53.
141. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsh & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
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makes you twice as miserable as gaining the same thing makes you
happy.”143 This use of framing will aid users in maintaining the
obscurity of their communications.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that while design-based solutions to protect
privacy are promising, current proposals such as privacy by design have
failed to tackle the social aspect of the Internet. This reluctance to tackle
the “front end” of design-based solutions is understandable. The social
web is messy, unpredictable, and amorphous. Mandating the inclusion of
privacy practices into the design of social technologies can be
problematic given that the goal of such technologies involves sharing
personal information.
This Article has proposed a new design strategy for social
technologies, which involves winnowing down from the unhelpful and
vague conceptualization of privacy to the narrower, more accurate and
attainable concept of obscurity. Information is obscure online if it exists
in a context missing one or more key factors that are essential to
discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors as
part of a non-exhaustive and flexible list: (1) search visibility, (2)
unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. The presence of
these factors diminishes obscurity, and their absence enhances it. Those
seeking to “bake” obscurity into the front-end of social technologies can
do so through technologies, organizational policies, and behavioral
interventions.
Where the pursuit of “privacy” in design often seems like a quest for
near-perfect protection, the goal of designing for obscurity is that it be
good enough for most contexts or to accommodate a user’s specific
needs. As the natural state for many online social communications,
obscurity is the logical locus for the front end design of social
technologies. Obscurity by design utilizes the full potential of designbased solutions to protect privacy and serve as a roadmap for
organizations and regulators who seek to confront the vexing problems
and contradictions inherent in social technologies.

143. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 33.

